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[DESCRIPTION] John Spencer speaks to the camera from an office setting. The Touro University logo is at the bottom right.

[JOHN SPENCER] I'll give you one example, again, which is both civilian harm mitigation, but also a very creative way to do things under these conditions, is that by February of 2024, it's a well-known practice for Hamas to use civilian infrastructure as a disguise for their military operations. 

So they'll try to blend in, and hospitals being a very sensitive site that they also do this. So even by February 2024, the practice of doing encirclements of not just facilities like hospitals and buildings, but entire neighborhoods of people, and then calling those people to come out through your forces, which is giving up some safety for the actual IDF. 

But to achieve the surprise, they use facial recognition stations, basically. And I found that fascinating, that the world didn't know that the IDF were doing this, even at the hospitals, which, it's called a call-out, where you surround and then you call everybody out. 

So in Khan Younis, the commander had done it in an early morning operation, encircled an area where over 100,000 people were still there, and then used all the notification methods to say, evacuate through these routes and use those facial recognition stations and sensors to identify the fighters and to grab them without even rounds being fired. Very unique and very creative, but also in this very complexity where there that isn't a story that even gets out. 

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[DESCRIPTION] Touro Talks intro displaying photos of students and faculty across the university, fading into the Touro University logo.

[TEXT] War in the City: John Spencer on Gaza, Civilians, and the Future of Modern Conflicts
October 1, 2025, Touro Talks is sponsored by Robert and Arlene Rosenberg

[DESCRIPTION] Dr. Alan Kadish speaks to the camera from a library setting. The Touro University logo is at the bottom right.

[ALAN KADISH] Hi, I'm Dr. Alan Kadish, President of Touro University. Welcome to Touro Talks. It's an absolute pleasure today to have John Spencer with us. John Spencer is an award-winning scholar and internationally recognized national security and military analyst, specializing in war, strategy, tactics, and related subjects. 

Considered one of the world's leading experts on urban warfare, he has served as an advisor to top generals and other senior leaders in the US Army, as part of strategic research groups, from the Pentagon and the United States Military Academy. 

[TEXT] Dr. Alan Kadish, President, Touro University

[ALAN KADISH] Spencer currently serves as the Chair of War Studies at the Madison Policy Forum. 

He served for over 25 years in the active army as an infantry soldier, and has held ranks from Private, Sergeant First Class, ultimately being promoted to Major while serving in elite and storied military units, from the 75th Ranger Regiment, 173rd Airborne, and the 4th Infantry Division. 

His assignments as an army officer included two combat deployments to Iraq as a platoon leader and company commander. After active duty, Spencer served as a Colonel in the California State Guard. His research spans from strategic to tactical levels of war, with a particular focus on military operations in dense urban and subterranean environments. 

His experience includes cutting-edge field work in ongoing and recently concluded conflicts, including those in India, Ukraine, Israel, and Gaza. He is the author of three books and over 180 book chapters, case studies, and professional articles. He's a regular military analyst and commentator for CNN, MSNBC, Fox, the BBC, and numerous other media organizations. Welcome, John Spencer. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Thanks for having me, Dr. Kadish. It's great to be with you. 

[ALAN KADISH] It's phenomenal to have you. So I said some things in your bio, but tell us a little bit about your background and how you first became interested in the military. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Well, I thank you for reading all of that. I came from a small town in Indiana. And I wanted to serve something bigger than myself. After high school, I joined the Army at the age of 17, spent 25 years in an amazing career with very unique opportunities-- education, travel, you name it.

[TEXT] John Spencer, Chair of War Studies, Madison Policy Forum

[JOHN SPENCER]I started also working at high echelons. 

When I was working in the Pentagon, selected for a research center, basically for the top four-star general in the Army. He started studying urban warfare academically. So I had my own combat experiences, of course, in Iraq-- two tours, from the invasion to the height of the sectarian violence in 2008. But really, when I started studying academically, urban warfare, I really became interested in that. 

Moved to West Point, the United States Military Academy, where I taught strategy and co-founded a research center called the Modern War Institute and started writing, researching urban warfare specifically. And after I retired, continued doing that and traveling into war zones to study that, really leading me, of course, to Israel many times before October 7. 

And since October 7, I've written, of course, very expansively on multiple facets of the conflict in Gaza, while also covering other wars in India, Azerbaijan, and other locations. So it all started when I was a teenager and has led me to now, where I really value education and why I'm excited to talk to you on many elements of the world we live in today, war being my specialty. 

But it's also about critical thinking, how we gain information. And wars, in general, weren't ever fought on the telephones of every individual around the world, billions of people. And there's a uniqueness to that in how it affects the nature of war, let alone the actual execution of a war. 

[ALAN KADISH] You've written a bunch of very high-quality academic papers. Tell us a little bit about your education and how you developed the expertise to be able to do that. Because usually, we're a university, we're used to people having fancy degrees. And so tell us a little bit about how you ended up with the expertise to write about such complex topics with so much talent. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Yeah, that's an interesting question. I actually wrote a chapter in one of those books on why I write, which actually explains how I discovered the love of writing. Because that's almost separate than the educational perspective. And from an educational background, I joined after high school and basically went to college while I was in the military, which is a great opportunity to include going to Georgetown to complete my master's in Public Diplomacy with a National Security Focus, and then applying it immediately in the Pentagon. 

But really, when I moved to West Point and exposure to teaching, and actually we developed multiple projects looking at pedagogy, from Bloom's taxonomy to everything. So I almost found the love of teaching and learning as well. And then exposure to the research center and research methodologies, but also in that research center at West Point or in the Pentagon, we had a cognitive scientist and everything. 

So we covered the different research methodologies-- comparative, ethnographic, everything that I started to mold my own way of thinking about research and learning in general that I took into when we created the Modern War Institute at West Point. But I also found a love of writing because I was exposed to an individual who taught me about different forms of writing, purposes of writing. 

I started writing a lot of commentary articles in New York Times, Wall Street Journal, all of those that were less academic, but also started doing even quantitative and qualitative research while at West Point, running research lanes, collecting data. I had so many opportunities to be exposed to the different types of research and different types of writing that I fell in love with both, especially when I started doing war research. 

I do comparative analysis. So I do a lot of research case studies. That's the big meat of my research methodology is case studies, looking at past battles and collecting all the information, and then publishing case studies on those. But really the ethnographic research of going into combat zones and talking to first persons and almost writing history has been a unique aspect of how that's done. 

And I love it because it's cutting edge, as you're actually trying to figure out what the key moments in an event are, do the due diligence in collecting all of that research, and then formulate it into a type of writing-- all based on that educational background that I received, but I continue to receive. And I get exposure still with colleagues and pushing myself on the research that I'm doing. 

[ALAN KADISH] So teaching at West Point must have been fascinating. How different is the West Point experience from other colleges and universities? 

[JOHN SPENCER] I would say very different, although the accreditation and sciences involved in it are very similar and would replicate. But of course, the veracity of the expectations of the students and the amount of time that they spend, a lot of analysis done on what it just takes to survive that as a student. 

But the same thing for the professors on the amount of classes they're covering, the inclusion of current operations and war, and things like that, into classes. There are everything from nuclear science to military sciences taught there, economics, and everything. Definitely that exposure to PhDs to how do you develop courses and curriculum and learning objectives. 

But from the cadet experience, from a student experience, there's some very unique aspects just to the load and expectations of a already pre-selected top 1% really of our nation. And that allows you to push the level of education to a different level. So I'd say there's some uniqueness, but also similarities. 

[ALAN KADISH] Great. So we're going to spend some time in just a moment talking about Gaza. But before we do that, I'd like to get a sense of the way you approach situations. So can you pick another historical situation which you analyzed from the standpoint of urban warfare, tell us a little bit about that situation, how you analyzed it and what the issues were? 

[JOHN SPENCER] Sure. I've written now 15 case studies, which are really the big meat on top of the book that I wrote, which is I also have a podcast, which I actually view as research as well. Because I'll interview the commanders from certain battles, the soldiers from those battles, or subject matter experts in things like concrete or certain technologies. 

I'm using those experts or commanders and students as part of my research to develop as well. But an example from those case studies, the Battle of Kyiv, which is a very recent one, which is as important to me as the historical, like the Stalingrad research that me and my co-authors did. The Battle of Kyiv was unique because it was like Gaza, something that you're trying to study as it's going on. 

Although Kyiv had recently ended, conducted six research trips into Kyiv, meeting with senior political and military leaders, but also walking to the ground where an event happened, which is something I learned from West Point as well. Because we do staff rides to places like Gettysburg, where you take the research that's been done on individual commanders and the event, and then you go to those locations and talk through how the terrain and the individual's decisions affected the overall outcome of the battle. 

That's what we did for the Battle of Kyiv, me and my partner going in six times to talk to all the commanders. And then go to all the locations to determine the critical moments and the lessons and what contributed to how that event went, whether good or bad-- whether a Russian attack in a certain location failed or didn't and then the Ukraine defense failed or didn't-- to make a story. 

Because it is about communicating complex situations that involve human factors into that. So in the Battle of Kyiv, that's a really good example of six trips in, walking the ground, talking to the commanders, requesting certain people who were at that location to do the due diligence, but also including a Russian military expert into our analysis of the order of battle of the Russian military or their air force capabilities. 

So it's really multi-dimensional, like war is, research being done on a real event. Now, if I take you to a past event like the Battle of Fallujah-- 

[ALAN KADISH] That was another event. So tell us one or two things that you learned, take-home lessons from the Battle of Kyiv. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Sure. One of the things that we took from the Battle of Kyiv was how much the terrain obstacles really factored in. So in that very large battle, three months long, some of the key factors were the immediate failures of Russia to get into the environment, when they tried to seize a single airfield and failed, and really how that affected their plan to be able to adapt to the uncertainty of the battle. 

Along with the Ukrainians blowing up hundreds of bridges leading into the city, which then stopped Russian advances after they had tried an airfield seizure and failed-- that was a critical lesson that really you could expand to any urban warfare scenario. Because it isn't necessarily what people think, about just tables and comparisons of two militaries. These factors of terrain and human decisions was a lesson that we learned in Kyiv that applies to any military in the world. 

[ALAN KADISH] I interrupted you as you we're about to talk about Fallujah, so go ahead. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Fallujah is one where we could incorporate everything that's been written, the official US military records, which actually were relatively new. So that battle happened in 2004. There was a first battle and a second battle. I actually served with some of the commanders who were the commanders of that battle, so I was able to contact them and do my own first person interviews of those individuals. 

But also, the US Army had published an official record of the Iraq war, with the specifics there. So combining, basically, fresh, first-person interviews, declassified documents from the war, to then create a holistic story-- some people think that that is really what militaries do. 

But even Israeli military and the US military, that isn't a given, when you're looking to do research, that there is already a record, even of some past event. So these battles, even that one from 2004 where there is a record, but there are also still living individuals, commanders that you can interview, to get that very rich aspect of the battle as it went on across the four weeks of that one. 

[ALAN KADISH] Let's now turn to Gaza. You mentioned previously that you visited Israel. And I know you visited Gaza. So how many times were you there before October 7, and since October 7? Tell us a little bit about the on-the-ground experience that you described. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Sure. My research and, of course, focused on urban warfare and subterranean warfare, because usually in urban battles, from the Battle of Kyiv and others, there is a underground component to it because of the nature of urban infrastructure. 

I had gone to Israel many times-- I don't have a count of the number-- researching everything from the battles of Second Intifada, Jenin, Nablus, the previous Gaza War. I just published a case study on the first Gaza War in 2008. Even in 1973, Battle of Suez City, I wrote a case study on that. I'd held conferences on tunnels in Reichman University back in 2018. 

Many times, I don't know how many times I had been there before October 7. But all the urban warfare training centers in Southern Israel, I'd been in Hezbollah tunnels in the north. I've been in Hamas tunnels. I've been in IDF tunnel training facilities. 

After October 7, I was on the ground by December of 2023, analyzing, first, the actual October 7 attack. Since I've done work on terrorist attacks, like the 2008 Mumbai attacks and others, I was also looking to do research on what had actually happened on October 7. 

And I wrote a lot about that, as how Hamas and the other terrorists and civilians executed, planned, and implemented the October 7 attack, and some very military planning elements that went into it. Total visits since October 7, I've visited six times. And I've embedded-- and we can talk about that, I'm sure you'll want to know-- with the IDF, in some fashion, five times into Gaza. 

Each time that I visit Gaza or visit Israel, I have a certain list of research goals that I'm looking into-- whether that's been the civilian harm mitigation measures that the IDF have implemented, how they've adapted to the historic, unprecedented element of the presence of civilians, but also the historic, unprecedented aspect of the tunnels in Gaza, that there is no actual comparative study-- real, direct comparison-- or the different learning techniques that the IDF have had to implement. 

Because the IDF, like I've studied in the past, every time it's been attacked, whether that's 1948, '67, '73, the Intifadas, they rapidly adapt themselves to that scenario. I knew that from my research. And that was a part of my research since October 7 was the changes that the IDF were making for the challenges that they were being presented in the environment. 

[ALAN KADISH] Tell us a little bit about what being embedded was like in more detail, or what you feel you can share. 

[JOHN SPENCER] That's complex. I published as much as I usually can, although the research is the result of that. Because I have a list of topics that I'm looking for based on, again, my past as well as if I enter Gaza with an IDF commander or unit, then I'm looking through the lens of urban warfare history as well. 

So even they don't know exactly what is being revealed to me. Some people believe that I'm on some type of tour and they're showing me only what I want to see. That's not true. From a analytical perspective, I actually have goals of the things, whether it's the civilian harm mitigation cell or commands that I want to talk to as I'm developing my overall research picture. 

Embedded, one example, with the 98th Division and going into Khan Younis, embedded with the division commander, who is taking me to his different units that are spread across Khan Younis, but also walking through the significant battles that had happened recently. 

And that was unique-- again, going back to that ethnographic of like the Battle of Khan Younis, which is really hard. Since this is a war and some of those other case studies were battles, it's helpful every time I've gone to then analyze which battle is ongoing, whether that's the Battle of Rafah. In that case in February of 2024, it was the Battle of Khan Younis. 

So talking to the division commanders, starting with an actual overview of how something was implemented, and then going into Gaza with him and going to the units, addressing the challenges-- how they've changed their force structure, their tactics, techniques, procedures, their technologies. And the big lesson out of that embed was the paradigm shift that the IDF had made towards how they approached the tunnels in Gaza. 

Because that was just a crippling aspect of, even though they were the most prepared military, probably in history, for tunnel warfare, based on their past experiences, to even having a entire brigade committed for years to the tunnel threat, the Special Forces Engineer Yahalom, they still found themselves drastically under-resourced and under-prepared for the tunnels of Gaza, just based on the mission change. 

And when I did that embed, I was able to watch them also looking for tunnels, how they find tunnels in the complexity of the dense urban environment of Khan Younis. But also to hear about, and I wrote about this, the complete paradigm shift to a tunnel being an obstacle to a tunnel being a avenue of approach-- so the IDF, by February of 2024, were entering Hamas tunnels before Hamas knew they were there. 

Because the booby-trapped elements of the Hamas tunnels was something, again, that there are a few comparisons, beyond some in Vietnam, where the actual tunnels were created with bombs in the walls to be booby trapped as a Hamas fighter fell back and wasn't using the tunnel anymore. So there's so many even cognitive paradigm shifts that the IDF made that I wrote that report. 

I'm really proud of that report because I think it applies so much to war in the future. As in, you can't look at a tunnel solely as an obstacle that the defender uses. They're avenues of approach as much as the surface and the air space is. And who controls it is a matter of timing and capability. 

[ALAN KADISH] You talked, obviously, the big controversy about the Gaza war, or one of the big controversies, is the extent of civilian casualties, insofar as a couple of days ago, Tom Friedman called it "unprecedented cruelty," which strikes me as utterly outrageous given some of the things that have happened in history. But you've talked about the civilian harm program. So tell us a little bit about that, your evaluation of it, and what the IDF is doing well and what perhaps it could do better. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Sure. Because I had been working in urban warfare studies for over a decade, I had also interacted with many human rights groups, the United Nations groups, even within the different militaries of the world, civilian harm mitigation groups. 

Because of the immense nature of the increase of urban warfare since World War 2, in the actual non-state actors and others that we've seen, whether it's Iraq, ISIS, or you name it, there have been developments, especially since even the Korean War, to try to mitigate the harm to civilians and civilian environments-- the infrastructure, the cities, the urban spaces. 

So when I went in to look at the civilian harm mitigations of Gaza that the IDF were implementing, I also had the awareness of everything that's ever come before in this one domain of how do you prevent civilian harm. And as the one following the legal requirements, especially like the proportionality assessment, where there is an assessment to ensure that the cost, the collateral damage is not excessive to the military objective, and then that the commanders and the militaries take every reasonable, feasible steps to mitigate that harm. 

Actually, being even lawful in the execution of the use of force in an urban environment is following the proportionality assessments. And on top, when you get into that precaution variable of the law of war, when you talk about, OK, what is reasonable and feasible to prevent civilian harm, you get into this other field of study called civilian harm mitigation measures. 

There are some best practices. And then there are some enduring practices that, given the different variables and where it is useful to look at past recent battles-- especially sieges or where there's a defender, there's an attacker, there's an encirclement, these kind of things, and the civilians are trapped there-- and that's where I was looking at, from October 7. 

Because just like everybody else, I have access to all the information that everybody else does. I have the uniqueness to being viewed as a researcher. I'm not a reporter. I'm a researcher analyzing different aspects of the very urban-centric nature of this war. That mitigation harm measures, I knew even before this war that the IDF actually deploys a list of civilian harm mitigation measures that no military in history has ever conducted, like the ability to call into the environment and reach individuals. 

Before, if you didn't analyze Israel's operations before October 7, and you looked at all other militaries, the use of notifications before a battle, it isn't that happens every time, but it did happen sometimes, when you're balancing, as the law of war accounts for, the military objective against the humanitarian imperative to do what's reasonable to prevent civilian harm within the military context. 

The previous kind of operations, what is done is, if the situation allows, you provide notification. You provide notification through flyers, maybe some TV and radio signals, and that's about it. Even before October 7, Israel did, of course, those things, the dropping of flyers and radio, TV, whatever type of social media communication. 

But after October 7, of course, Israel did that, which is called the civilian notification, civilian temporary evacuations. Of course, you have to add in the context that, because Egypt stated that they would not allow any civilians to leave Gaza, it did create a urban warfare historical scenario that has no precedents, where the civilians don't have a way to get out of the main combat areas. 

It just never happened. But that's why the challenges were immense. Looking at these civilian harm mitigation measures that have changed since October 7, but just the ones implemented in November of 2023 would be more than any military in the history of war. 

Because not only the dropping of fliers, but the millions of phone calls into Gaza to notify all civilians to leave certain areas, telling them what route to take, where to go, text messages, voice messages, drones with speakers. But also, even in November of 2023, daily pauses in the height of the battle to allow civilians to evacuate. The other measures of the type of munitions, so that the IDF uses a small diameter munition. 

The practice of roof knocking, which was previous to October 7, where the IDF had developed a technique that if there's a building that they want to strike because it's an "enemy used for military purposes" infrastructure, they'll notify everybody using these unique only-to-Israel notification methods, and then still deploy non-explosives on the roof of a building they want to strike. 

And they were doing that even after October 7, the practice of roof knocking. As this evolved, though, by the time I'm visiting in February of 2024-- I was looking at in December of '23 on my first research trip-- by February of 2024, because of the complexity of the fact that not only was Egypt barring civilians from getting out of harm's way and there being the establishment of a humanitarian zone within the combat area, which is unique. 

In the Al-Mawasi Humanitarian Zone, the IDF also recognized that Hamas was stopping the population from evacuating, which isn't exactly new, but also unique in the ways that Hamas was setting up roadblocks, issuing out written guidance to their own population, not allowing civilians into bomb shelters or the tunnels. So there's 300 miles of tunnels. 

So the fact that the civilians couldn't seek refuge, even if they were trapped, in those underground infrastructures is unique as well. Going back to Kyiv, that's where the civilians sought refuge in all the cities across Ukraine, if they were trapped in the underground. Hamas puts out guidance that the civilians aren't allowed in those. But by February 2024, Israel is now implementing more of those civilian harm mitigation measures that no other military that I know of-- and I've done the research. 

They started issuing their own military maps. Well, I actually teach in one of the only courses in the world. They started issuing their maps to the civilians and to their enemy, which are these grid reference zones, where they identify even within a small area like Khan Younis, zones that are numbered and communicate that for civilian harm mitigation measures. 

So every day, if they're in operations in a certain zone in Khan Younis, like Zone 203, now these civilians have that map. So when they get messages saying we will be operating in Zone 203 today. If you're in that area, please evacuate. If you're not, please stay away from that area. And they were signaling that not only to the civilians for civilian harm mitigation and the pursuit of precaution, but they were also implementing it to their enemy. 

Furthermore, the civilian harm mitigation cell that you mentioned that I wanted to talk to, and I did talk to multiple times, where they established a one-star general with this cell using, again, technologies not used and people criticize that it's not good enough, although it's never been used, where they started tracking the civilian population by actual cell phone in the environment. 

So they could color-code their maps where there was presence of civilians or people in general still there and then dictate their operations. That, they started doing. But all of these civilian harm mitigation measures add up to what the IDF were doing to prevent civilian harm in their pursuit of their legitimate goals. 

[ALAN KADISH] How do you fight a war where you tell the enemy where you're going to be? And isn't it just a whack-a-mole game because you'll never be able to get a completed victory in that way? 

[JOHN SPENCER] No, you do. So from Sun Tzu, and again, as you understand, if you teach something, you have to achieve a certain level of knowledge of it than just knowing it. You have to have that mastery to communicate it to others. So teaching military theory like Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini was really helpful, and helpful in this question. 

Of course, Sun Tzu, to everybody says, surprise is a huge factor, like the factor in war. And you do give it away under these very unique conditions. But that's almost, in some ways, balancing that humanitarian imperative versus the military objective. Then the IDF does have to be very creative in how to still achieve surprise. 

I'll give you one example again, which is both civilian harm mitigation, but also a very creative way to do things under these conditions. By February of 2024, it's a well-known practice for Hamas to use civilian infrastructure as a disguise for their military operations. So they'll try to blend in, and hospitals, being a very sensitive site, that they also do this. 

So even by February 2024, the practice of doing encirclements of not just facilities like hospitals and buildings, but entire neighborhoods of people, and then calling those people to come out through your forces, which is giving up some safety for the actual IDF. But to achieve the surprise to use facial recognition stations, basically. 

So the IDF would call the individuals, like out of a hospital, which they did at Al-Nasser and others, and then facial recognitions are actually picking out the Hamas fighters and others out of the crowd who are trying to blend in with the civilians. As clearly, anybody can say, this causes a lot harder to get to the enemy. But you still have to be adaptive. 

And I found that fascinating that the world didn't know that the IDF were doing this, even at the hospitals, which it's called a call-out where you surround and then you call everybody out so you don't have to enter, like they did in the second battle of Al-Shifa Hospital, where Hamas were firing from inside the hospital. 

But like this, in Khan Younis, the commander had done it in an early morning operation, encircled an area where over 100,000 people were still there, and then used all the notification methods to say, evacuate through these routes, and used those facial recognition stations and sensors to identify the fighters and to grab them without even rounds being fired. 

Very unique and very creative, but also in this very complexity where that isn't a story that even gets out-- how the IDF are still achieving the military goals. And they have been very effective, despite all of these uniqueness in the history of war. 

[ALAN KADISH] You've made a very compelling case for how the IDF has tried to minimize civilian casualties. That hasn't made it into the public view. The public is not certainly as impressed as you are with the IDF's effort to minimize civilian casualties. A recent poll showed a substantial percentage actually believe that Israel is intentionally harming civilians. So why is there this disconnect with what you, with your expertise, say is happening on the ground and what the public perception is? What's been responsible for that? 

[JOHN SPENCER] There's many factors, clearly. Luckily, again, I had been very familiar with different groups, with credentials, groups that may be good-intentioned, but have a history of the way they collect data, and then the way they present that data, whether that's United Nations Human Rights Council, Office of Human Rights Council, whether that's the United Nations commissioning a report, whether that's Amnesty International or others, who I would question the way [INAUDIBLE]. 

But then there's also the law of war analysis aspect of this, when you get to what's called intentionality and things like that. Because there isn't the openness to information that isn't actually unique to Israel, but because of the demand for information, there's been a very problematic practice from really from October 7, as I've been writing-- I've written over 61 pieces trying to call out the individual cases of interpretations of the law of war or interpretations of the data that is available. 

One of the challenges here is that we have people, even with knowledge and credibility, that do what's called effects-based condemnation and analysis. It doesn't matter what research I've done or any other individuals. Because I'm not the only one. 

There have been multiple groups of high-level people with military backgrounds-- generals, lawyers, others who have had access to information have gone into Gaza with the IDF, very different type of research-- who have come to the same conclusions and have looked at the same analysis to include civilian harm mitigation measures and how they do strikes and all of this. 

But you have other groups who have done what's called effects-based condemnations, meaning they take any amount of data they have, then they infer the context to include intention and action that is based on the effects of operation and rule out any context that I might provide or any other body saying, why aren't you including the context of the military industrialized infrastructure of Gaza that would account for-- whether that's destruction or the tactics of Hamas, human shields and human sacrifice, or Hamas killing of individuals in Gaza, or the rockets, or so many other aspects to the effects? 

But very, very matter of factually, especially from critical thinking, from educational perspective, the effects of military operations isn't how the legality or morality of an operation has ever been and can't be assessed. 

Whether it's a claim towards genocide or intentionality or whatever it is, or civilian harm mitigation, for the analyst to take only the effects of the operation and say-- this proves intentionality, this proves, despite all other data, intent to harm civilians or civilian infrastructure-- that effects-based, post-facto type of analysis is not how the law of war has ever worked or can ever work. Because it would set the recipe for very disastrous methodologies used by people that don't even follow the law of war, if that makes sense. 

[ALAN KADISH] Sure. What role does the media played in this misperception? 

[JOHN SPENCER] Again, these are very complex aspects of, one, like I talked about, the fact that this war, which has very unique aspects to doing comparative analysis, has no comparison in the elements of media interpretations. Like I said, because of the cell phone, the social media aspect, more people get their news and information from X than any other media source in the world at this moment. 

And I think that will continue. That's just a fact. So how information, narratives, or even the portrayal of data is presented has to factor in the fact that it can be manipulated by an algorithm-driven social media platform and different voices along with that. Now, if you talk about what we call mainstream media, they, of course, have had a large role from the beginning in how to report the information that is being given. 

Of course, there is an element here of the IDF does not have a embedded media program, which has been a criticism, and rightfully so. Although, I don't argue that if they had, there would be a different interpretation of Israel's actions. But it's just a fact they don't have, and there are other militaries who don't have. 

And it isn't access that the international media wants. It is free access. They want the access to be embedded with a force for as long as they want and to go anywhere they want, despite the concerns. And there are elements to that. And when did even the United States, or Western military, start free-embedded, as in no-credentialed, no access, no restrictions to media start? 

But we live in this world where everybody wants information and they don't trust anybody, and all those elements. But from a journalistic, if you to go to a journalism class on what are the journalistic ethics and standards, I think the media has played a role in that. 

When they do things, either lie by omission-- and I have caught very mainstream media doing that in their portrayal of operations in Gaza, where they will purposely leave out something that is very critical to a position. Or they report information without the actual caveats that a journalistic standard would say, such as the Gaza Health Ministry, which is a Hamas organization by definition. 

But you could see through international media reporting where that changed. Originally, it started with "Hamas-led Gaza Health Ministry" to the point where they'll just say "Palestinian authorities," to the point where they will change-- and I'm talking mainstream media-- the type of reporting and the way it's worded to the point that it would not meet either fact-checking journalistic standards prior to October 7, or in any other case, that I do believe there is a responsibility. 

But this information operations, information narrative aspect to the wars, also, there's a lot of very uniqueness to it. And I have been, not in my actual research, but in addressing the lies by omission or the very disingenuous reporting, have been playing whack-a-mole to things like-- how we define genocide, or how do we report a number and then not provide the context to that number, how the law of war is. 

And one example is New York Times, which does have good reporters doing good things, but put out a very big special-- let alone I won't even address the New York Times front page of a child and then inferring that that child is in that state because of a lack of access to food. That's a separate, very bad, and should be condemned by any journalistic standard. 

But a story that led, also very leading, that Israel changed its authorization or acceptability of civilian casualties and collateral damage, from before October 7 to after October 7, without giving the reader, the vital context, that any other nation who was involved in a counterterrorism operation before October 7 and then do an assessment of proportionality versus a war after October 7, again, after being attacked, would of course assess proportionality different because of the military goals in every element of how that is assessed. 

But they just say, Israel changed the number of civilians that can be killed in a bombing from before October 7 to after October 7, when that's actually just a factual statement and not explaining why. 

[ALAN KADISH] Sure. So let's turn to what's going on now. Israel's fighting in Gaza City. There is a new peace proposal. I'm not going to ask you to be a prophet here. But what I will ask you is this-- what do you see happening if the peace proposal is accepted? And what do you see happening if it's not? 

[JOHN SPENCER] Because I taught war, war has three never-changing variables-- one, it's human, it's political, it's always for the pursuit of political goals. So you always have to factor in the political, both local, regional, geopolitical. And it's uncertain. So that's my caveat I always give. Because it doesn't change in predicting the future. 

And I got this after October 7. How long will this take? And there's just so many elements of this. You're right. So right now, Israel is undertaking the largest battle that they've ever attempted in their history, which is the Battle of Gaza City, which you then could compare to other battles like the 2016 and '17 Battle of Mosul. 

There is a comparative analysis that could be done in what Israel, the man- just the force that he was going to apply against Gaza City, which they stated would be five divisions. They currently only have three divisions. But the challenge of evacuating the civilians and finding Hamas, all those elements are there. And Israel is progressing, as we're talking forward. 

But thanks to President Trump's work with many nations, and the United States administration, of course, there is a new peace plan that is very unique to any peace plan. Although there are some nuances here, as an academic, to peace plan terms, deal, things like that are unique. 

But in this new 20-point plan that has been written, I've written that as a war analyst, this plan, unlike any other plan, even for the region, addresses so many critical elements that all other plans, China just wished away, like the irreconcilable aspects of Hamas, like the radicalization of the population of Gaza, which are pretty much factual. 

And there's lots of data to support that, which does get to, how do you end a war? This plan, this 20-point plan, not only addresses the very legitimate goals of Israel against Hamas in Gaza, it addresses the concerns of the Palestinian people, of the regional actors. Because war is always about more than just the two actors that are involved. But war is always a contest of will. 

And this plan also removes the one factor that has protracted this war-- and all the people that we've been talking about have been a part of protracting this war-- is Hamas' will to believe that they can win the war, as in survive the war. This plan nups that into the bud, and then gets Arab, Muslim, and all other countries that have agreed to that, that absolutely, we all agree that Hamas will not survive the war as a political organization with military capabilities. 

And it addresses all of the concerns that people have had, whether legitimate or not-- like the forced displacement, like the rebuilding, like the reforms of Palestinian government, whether that's Palestinian authorities or whatever comes after Gaza. The actual condition-based elements of this plan, and most importantly, it rules into the fact that Hamas is not reconcilable, although they're being given one more chance at terms and the ability to leave Gaza, disarm, reconcile, all these things. 

But it actually, unlike everything since October 7, factors in-- what if Hamas says no or tries to go ridiculous, even with what they want to negotiate, which is problematic in war as well. This plan applies at all, also giving a day-after element to it. How would it work if Hamas says, no, I'm going to continue fighting to the death of us all, like it has? 

How will it work incrementally, as Israel continues the operation to close with and destroy Hamas fighters, leadership, anything that supports it? And the pursuit of finding and rescuing their hostages, while also addressing the moving forward in Gaza through the international stabilization force, which is a war analyst, is huge. 

Because once you enter the environment, there are elements to how to stabilize that environment afterwards. And this takes that ownership off of the Israel government and IDF by having multiple people have not only support, but buy-in and contribution to moving forward at this point. For me, I don't know where it's going to go. 

Because you've also seen, as we're talking, countries now backpedaling to what they said they would be supporting the plan. But the United States has, especially this administration, been unwavering in the conditions that should be acknowledged by everybody. And now having nations like Indonesia, UAE, and others fully support this plan that covers almost every element of it is significant. 

[ALAN KADISH] It certainly sounds encouraging. There have been varying reports in the news over the past couple of days about whether Hamas will accept the plan. And by the time we air this, actually, it may become quite clear. So I hope your enthusiasm for the success of the plan is warranted. 

It's controversial in many places. And the Israeli government may need the opposition to actually support the plan in order to get it passed. But we can only hope that you'll be able to study the urban warfare in Gaza post-hoc instead of in the middle. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Yeah, and-- 

[ALAN KADISH] Go ahead, I'm sorry. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Dr. Kadish, I just wanted to clarify, I don't know if this plan will have success. I'm saying it's the most comprehensive plan that's been even proposed, with the most likelihood to show success. I don't know, ultimate success, there's always uncertainty. And I've been concerned, even from an Israeli population, it's a democracy, a very vibrant and complex government democracy where they can make a decision on whether they want to continue paying the price. 

Because there's still a lot of warfare against Hamas, unless they do unilaterally surrender, which is probably less likely. But you can't rule that out. I don't know if this plan would have success. But I think it's the most comprehensive plan that's been suggested so far. But war is uncertain. 

[ALAN KADISH] No, I understand that completely. I would say that many people would say that if the hostages are released early, as the plan is implemented, that in itself would be at least a partial victory, not just for Israel, but for humanity to show that, ultimately, the idea of attacking civilians with no regard for damage-- in fact, targeting civilians specifically, as Hamas clearly did in October 7, dosing its fighters with drugs so that they don't feel any resistance to massacring civilians-- if we can get those hostages released, I think many people would say at least that part of the plan is successful. Let's hope it happens. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Absolutely. 

[ALAN KADISH] John Spencer, your expertise and articulate nature of the way you present things is amazing. I really appreciate you joining us on Touro Talks. And we look forward to speaking with you in the future. 

[JOHN SPENCER] Thank you, Dr. Kadish. Thank you.

[ALAN KADISH] I'd like to thank the audience and our sponsors. And we look forward to having you join us again. Have a great day, and let's hope for peace. Thank you. 

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[TEXT] Touro Talks, Touro University, touro.edu/tourotalks

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